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WAR AND (LABOR) PEACE: HOW THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHANGED THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR
SERVICE PROVIDERS AND ORGANIZED LABOR
KLAYTON SWEITZER HILAND*
I. SERVICE PROVIDERS MUST NOW BRING KNIVES
TO A GUNFIGHT
IN AIRLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS ASSOCIATION V. LOS ANGE-LES WORLD AIRPORTS, the Ninth Circuit held that the City
of Los Angeles, operator of the fourth largest airport in the
world,1 may require airline service providers to enter into Labor
Peace Agreements with organized labor representatives.2 Al-
though the court correctly ruled that the trade association plain-
tiffs had standing and that the plaintiffs should have the
opportunity to amend their complaint, the court erred in af-
firming the district court’s decision to dismiss the complaint.3
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that the city was
acting as a market participant, rather than a regulator, when im-
posing contract conditions on the service providers.4 The proxi-
mate holding that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
does not preempt the city’s action was premised on an error.5
The City of Los Angeles operates Los Angeles International
Airport (LAX) through its agency, Los Angeles World Airports
(LAWA).6 Airlines operating out of LAX hire other businesses to
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2019; B.B.A., The
University of Texas at Austin, May 2013. The author would like to thank his
parents, Kirk and Theresa, for the opportunities they have provided him. Most of
all, he would like to thank his wife, Sara, without whom law school would not be
possible.
1 Airline Serv. Providers Ass’n v. L.A. World Airports, 873 F.3d 1074, 1093 (9th
Cir. 2017).
2 Id. at 1077.
3 See id.
4 Id. at 1079.
5 Id. at 1079–80.
6 About LAWA, CITY OF LOS ANGELES, http://www.lawa.org/welcome_lawa.aspx
?id=326 [https://perma.cc/5QJM-FWMC] (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
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provide services such as baggage handling, who then must ob-
tain a license from LAWA.7 LAWA imposes conditions for those
licenses, including Section 25, which prompted this case.8 Sec-
tion 25 requires that all licensed service providers enter into a
Labor Peace Agreement (LPA) with any union that requests one
and that the LPA prohibit work disruptions.9 If the parties can-
not agree, Section 25 requires mediation and binding arbitra-
tion after sixty days.10 The Airline Service Providers Association
and the Airline Transport Association of the Americas sued to
challenge Section 25 as a regulation preempted by federal
laws,11 including the NLRA.12 The district court dismissed for
lack of standing and failure to state a claim; plaintiffs appealed
both issues.13
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK: WHY SERVICE PROVIDERS CAN
ONLY BRING KNIVES
The Supreme Court ruled that NLRA preemption applies to
state and local regulations; entities acting for their proprietary
interest in the market are presumed not to be preempted.14 The
Ninth Circuit applied the two-pronged test in Cardinal Towing &
Auto Repair, Inc. v. City of Bedford to determine whether LAWA
acted as a market participant rather than a regulator when im-
posing Section 25.15 The first prong asks, “Does the challenged
action . . . reflect the entity’s own interest in its efficient procure-
ment of needed goods and services, as measured by comparison
with the typical behavior of private parties in similar circum-
stances?”16 The second prong questions whether the action’s
scope is narrow enough to “defeat an inference that its primary





12 See generally National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012).
13 Airline, 873 F.3d at 1077–78.
14 Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders & Con-
tractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 227 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Boston Harbor].
15 Airline, 873 F.3d at 1080; see Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City of
Bedford, 180 F.3d 686, 693 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Johnson v. Rancho Santiago
Cmty. Coll. Dist., 623 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010).
16 Cardinal Towing, 180 F.3d at 693.
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goal was to encourage a general policy rather than address a
specific proprietary problem.”17
To answer these questions, the court relied on a variety of
precedential, yet distinguishable, cases. First, the court applied
Johnson v. Rancho Santiago Community College District, which held
that a community college district could impose LPA require-
ments on construction contractors because of a proprietary in-
terest in procuring labor without disruption.18 The court
contrasted Johnson with Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los
Angeles, where the Supreme Court held that the city could not
condition a taxi company’s license on a strike ending because
the city had no proprietary interest in the operations of a private
taxi company and did not contract for their services.19 Here, the
Ninth Circuit found that Section 25’s application was more akin
to the LPA in Johnson because the city operated the airport, com-
peted in the transportation market, and had a proprietary inter-
est in preventing strikes.20
Addressing the second prong, the court rejected the plain-
tiff’s argument that three cases showed Section 25’s scope to be
too broad to avoid regulation status.21 The court declined to ap-
ply Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor, & Human Relations v.
Gould Inc. because Section 25 purported to cover only the air-
port’s contractual relationships rather than all state procure-
ment transactions.22 Next, the court distinguished Section 25
from an overturned California law preventing state contractors
from using state funds to either support or oppose employee
union organization.23 That law was not “specifically tailored to
one particular job,”24 whereas Section 25 was “limited to ad-
dressing the needs of LAX.”25 Finally, the court held that Sec-
17 Id.
18 Johnson, 623 F.3d at 1028. The court also found a sufficiently narrow scope; it
applied only to a specific project, funded by a specific bond initiative, and for a
specific time period. Id. at 1024–29.
19 Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 617–18
(1986).
20 Airline, 873 F.3d at 1080–82.
21 Id. at 1082–84.
22 Id. at 1082–83; see Wisconsin Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v.
Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 291 (1986).
23 Airline, 873 F.3d at 1083; see Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 554
U.S. 60, 70 (2008).
24 Brown, 554 U.S. at 70 (quoting Gould, 475 U.S. at 291). The overturned Cali-
fornia law’s preamble also declared a regulatory intention and included addi-
tional record keeping and fund segregation requirements. Id. at 71.
25 Airline, 873 F.3d at 1083.
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tion 25 was distinguishable from similar ordinances that, though
intended to achieve similar LPA results, might have “spillover
effects on the service providers’ operations” and encourage
unionization.26 The Ninth Circuit held that imposing Section 25
was narrow enough to defeat an inference of regulatory action
and applied the market participant exception.27
Judge Tallman, in dissent, argued that Section 25’s impact was
the exact result that Congress intended to preempt through the
NLRA by creating a uniform regulatory scheme surrounding la-
bor policy.28 The dissent cited two preemption doctrines.29 First,
local governments may not “regulate activity that the NLRA pro-
tects, prohibits, or arguably protects or prohibits.”30 Second,
preemption applies to areas “left ‘to be controlled by the free
play of economic forces.’”31 Because Section 25 mandates that
LPAs result from negotiations and artificially limits bargaining
strategies, it is preempted by the NLRA.32 Next, the dissent ar-
gued that the market participant exception is based on the “ac-
tual content of [the] policy and its real effect on federal
rights”33 instead of its supposed purpose.34 After applying this
analysis to Section 2535 and comparing its effects to those of the
laws addressed in the majority’s cited cases,36 the dissent found
26 Id.; see Metro. Milwaukee Ass’n of Commerce v. Milwaukee County, 431 F.3d
277, 282 (7th Cir. 2005).
27 Airline, 873 F.3d at 1084.
28 Id. at 1086–87; see San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local
2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242–43 (1959) (the NLRA is “a complex and inter-
related federal scheme of law, remedy, and administration.”).
29 Airline, 873 F.3d at 1087 (Tallman, J., dissenting).
30 Id. (quoting Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 65
(2008)).
31 Id. (quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608,
618 (1986)).
32 Id. at 1088.
33 Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 119 (1994).
34 Airline, 873 F.3d at 1089 (Tallman, J., dissenting). The dissent focused on
the Brown Court’s decision to overlook proprietary interests and rule based on
the law’s market effects. Id.; see Brown, 554 U.S. at 70–73.
35 Airline, 873 F.3d at 1090–94 (Tallman, J., dissenting).
36 See Brown, 554 U.S. at 70–73; Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. 218, 232 (1993); Wis-
consin Dep’t. of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282,
291 (1986); Johnson v. Rancho Santiago Cmty. Coll. Dist., 623 F.3d 1011,
1024–29 (9th Cir. 2010); Metro. Milwaukee Ass’n of Commerce v. Milwaukee
County, 431 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 2005).
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that Section 25 failed to meet both prongs of the Cardinal Tow-
ing37 test.
III. ANALYSIS: WHY CONGRESS WANTED BOTH SIDES
TO HAVE GUNS
A. THE MAJORITY ERRED IN APPLYING THE FIRST
CARDINAL TOWING PRONG
The majority failed to address the core issue of Cardinal Tow-
ing’s first prong: whether “the challenged governmental action
[is] undertaken in pursuit of the ‘efficient procurement of
needed goods and services,’ as one might expect of a private
business in the same situation.”38 The key question is not
whether they operate in a market, but rather whether an action
has the “manifest purpose and inevitable effect” of conflicting
with the “complex and interrelated federal scheme of law, rem-
edy, and administration.”39 The NLRA “treats state action differ-
ently from private action . . . because they. . . take different
forms, [and] also because . . . States simply are different from
private parties and have a different role.”40 The market partici-
pant exception only allows government to avoid preemption
when acting as a private business would.41 Section 25 failed the
first prong because its purpose and effect altered the regulatory
scheme imposed by the NLRA beyond the capabilities of an ac-
tual private entity.
The majority failed to accurately address both the purpose
and effect of Section 25. Section 25 purports to address business
disruptions42 but has an attenuated relationship with that pur-
pose and appears regulatory. LAWA has an interest in running a
competitive airport, but it is the airline that contracts with the
service providers.43 The conditions imposed on service providers
in exchange for licenses to operate at LAX are not bargained
for by the service providers in their contract with the airline;
they are mandates imposed by the airport. LAWA is only procur-
ing services from the airlines, not the service providers em-
ployed by them. Section 25 imposes a hiring policy on the
37 See Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City of Bedford, 180 F.3d 686,
693 (5th Cir. 1999).
38 Airline, 873 F.3d at 1080 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
39 See Gould, 475 U.S. at 286, 291.
40 Id. at 290.
41 See id.
42 See Airline, 873 F.3d at 1077.
43 Id.
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airlines, without allowing the airlines and service providers to
negotiate as expected in a free market. LAWA is exercising the
power of law to take actions unavailable to private enterprises;
otherwise, the licensing terms would be negotiated between
LAWA and the airline, the service providers, or both. Thus,
LAWA’s ability to impose licensing conditions separates Section
25’s purpose and effect from those expected of private
enterprises.44
Section 25 is designed to be ineffective in preventing work
disruption but very effective in altering bargaining positions;
this infers regulatory intent. Alternatives like incentives, bo-
nuses, liquidated damages, and refusal to renew contracts have
been cited as the usual way to address labor issues for private
employers.45 “Employers know better how to keep their workers
from striking than purchasers of the employers’ services.”46 The
court record contained no evidence that private businesses had
ever attempted to mandate LPAs in licensing service providers.47
Free bargaining would likely preclude private businesses from
similar solutions. Section 25 is particularly ineffective because its
conditions only impact service providers using unionized labor
asking for LPAs; other employees may still strike.48 Also, Section
25 only penalizes service providers for LPA violations while pro-
viding no more incentive for unions to avoid disruptions than a
standard employment contract.49 Because Section 25’s design is
ineffective in its alleged purpose, the court should have inferred
an alternative—and preempted—purpose.
Contrarily, Section 25 is effective, to the point of being pre-
empted, in altering the balance of power between service prov-
iders and unions in collective bargaining. Economic disruption
is perhaps a union’s strongest negotiation tool; unions will not
relinquish this weapon easily.50 Mandating negotiation out-
comes shows Section 25’s true purpose and effect in two ways.
First, it inherently alters the negotiation structure. Mandatory
no-strike clauses are a significant departure from the “free play
44 See generally National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).
45 Metro. Milwaukee Ass’n of Commerce v. Milwaukee County, 431 F.3d 277,
280 (7th Cir. 2005).
46 Id.
47 Airline, 873 F.3d at 1090 (Tallman, J., dissenting).
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1091.
50 Id. at 1091–92.
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of economic forces” prescribed in Boston Harbor.51 The NLRA
requires good faith but “does not compel either party to agree
to a proposal or require the making of a concession.”52 Section
25, however, does obligate an outcome and coerces service prov-
iders to make concessions until an LPA is signed.53 The NLRA
created the scheme for labor regulation, and Section 25 alters it;
the effect is inherently regulatory. Second, by mandating both
mediation and binding arbitration after sixty days, Section 25
provides unions with bargaining power beyond that prescribed
in the NLRA.54 Unions can hold out longer because the process
guarantees binding arbitration likely resulting in significant con-
cessions.55 The service providers, however, have lost the ability
to wait out the union. Section 25 does not allow economic forces
and negotiation strategies to work freely. The effect and pur-
pose of Section 25 is to tip the negotiations toward unions. Sec-
tion 25 fails the first Cardinal Towing prong and is preempted.
B. THE MAJORITY ERRED IN APPLYING THE SECOND
CARDINAL TOWING PRONG
The majority found that Section 25 is distinguished from
other precedent56 and is narrow under the second Cardinal Tow-
ing prong. Section 25, the majority claims, is distinguished from
other preempted laws because it does not apply to all of the
city’s contracts, declare a regulatory purpose, impose additional
burdens related to record keeping or enforcement, or impose
conditions favorable to union organizing.57 The majority drasti-
cally underestimated Section 25’s reach within the operations of
LAX and the overall marketplace.
51 See Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. 218, 225 (1993) (quoting Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S.
132, 140 (1976)).
52 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012).
53 See Airline, 873 F.3d at 1090 (Tallman, J., dissenting); Golden State Transit
Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 616 (1986).
54 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
55 Mediation garnered pay increases of 6% despite a 3.2% guideline and 4.5%
settlement. Today in Labor History: Airline Workers Strike in 1966, PEOPLE’S WORLD
(July 8, 2015, 11:28 AM), http://www.peoplesworld.org/article/today-in-labor-
history-airline-workers-strike-in-196/ [https://perma.cc/W4AH-D2QR].
56 Airline, 873 F.3d at 1082–83.
57 Id.; see Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 70 (2008);
Wisconsin Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282, 291
(1986); Metro. Milwaukee Ass’n of Commerce v. Milwaukee County, 431 F.3d
277, 280–82 (7th Cir. 2005).
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On its face, Section 25 is broad enough to infer it is a regula-
tory action. It does not declare its regulatory intention,58 but a
missing preamble does not comfort those enduring the effects
of a broad labor policy. Although it is not a city-wide licensing
policy,59 it impacts a significant share of the local and global
transportation markets. Section 25 does not address individual
disruptions or timely performance of specific services.60 Rather,
it is an ongoing policy that applies to all service providers.61 On
its face, Section 25 is insufficiently narrow.
The majority also failed to account for Section 25’s impact on
national and international labor and transportation markets.
Section 25 contains no internal or external controls to limit its
jurisdictional scope or possible LPA provisions.62 Service provid-
ers may be coerced to sign an LPA covering labor outside of
LAX. Also, LPAs tend to promote labor organization.63 Thus,
Section 25 is designed to do more than prevent service disrup-
tions; it encourages and facilitates unionization, thereby increas-
ing labor’s propensity to utilize its economic disruption
arsenal.64
Therefore, Section 25 is broad on its face and general in its
effects so as to defeat any inference that it was tailored to ad-
dress a proprietary problem. It could easily impact markets
outside of LAWA’s jurisdiction. The court should have con-
cluded that Section 25 failed the Cardinal Towing test and was
subject to NLRA preemption.
IV. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN SERVICE PROVIDERS
ARE OUTGUNNED?
The ramifications of the Ninth Circuit’s error may be cata-
strophic. As unions gain bargaining power, the industry can ex-
pect to see increased concessions by service providers to garner
the required LPAs.65 This is particularly worrisome given labor
costs’66 impact on growth and consistency.67 The industry has a
58 See Airline, 873 F.3d at 1083; Brown, 554 U.S. at 70.
59 See Gould, 475 U.S. at 291.
60 See Airline, 873 F.3d at 1092 (Tallman, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 1093.
62 See id.
63 Id. at 1092.
64 See id.
65 See id. at 1093.
66 Labor costs accounted for 25% of all airline expenses in 2006. Barry Hirsch,
Unions and Wages in the US Airline Industry, INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASS’N 1 (July 2007),
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history of labor-related68 insolvency,69 and multiple bailouts
were conditioned on labor cost reductions to mitigate solvency
risks.70 Increasing labor’s collective bargaining power in LAX
will cause continued financial struggle.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s failure to protect the NLRA’s regulatory
scheme will inherently alter the power relationship between ser-
vice providers and labor interests operating LAX. The majority
has delivered to labor organizations powerful bargaining weap-
ons. History indicates that this new power will cause financial
instability throughout the market.
http://www.iata.org/publications/economic-briefings/Hirsch_Unions_Wages
.pdf [https://perma.cc/CV7C-RTHW].
67 Renegotiated labor contracts have hurt airlines and offset gains from lower
fuel costs. ZACKS EQUITY RESEARCH, High Fuel Costs Likely to Hurt Airlines Q3 Earn-
ings Picture, YAHOO FIN. (Sept. 26, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/high-
fuel-costs-likely-hurt-191707822.html [https://perma.cc/3G3J-LQZZ].
68 “[T]he airline was in the midst of battle with its labor unions over wage
reductions when it entered bankruptcy protection.” Barbara Kiviat, Continental
Airlines, TIME (Apr. 2, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/
article/0,28804,1888946_1888944_1888942,00.html.
69 The airline industry has seen 189 bankruptcies since 1990. American Joins
Long List of Airline Bankruptcies, BOSTON.COM (Nov. 29, 2011), http://archive.bos
ton.com/business/articles/2011/11/29/american_joins_long_list_of_airline_
bankruptcies/.
70 “America West was handed a $379.6 million loan-guarantee package. In re-
turn, the government demanded severe limits on labor costs. . . .” Sally B. Don-
nelly, Air Support, TIME (Nov. 24, 2003), http://content.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,1006304,00.html.
